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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
states that "course of dealing" refers solely to a sequence of conduct under
contracts prior to the one in issue. It does not refer to conduct under the
present contract. Moreover, Section 1-205(4) clearly provides that when a
"course of dealing" hopelessly conflicts with an express term in the contract,
the latter controls. Thus, in asserting that the parties' conduct under the
present agreement had established a "course of dealing" and that this "course
of dealing" could be relevant to show a waiver of his obligation to pay forth-
with for the cars he had sold, the plaintiff simply drew from an erroneous
assumption an erroneous conclusion.
Nor did the delayed payments constitute a "course of performance"
under Section 2-208(1). While a "course of performance" does refer to a
pattern of action under the contract in issue and is relevant to demonstrate
the waiver of an inconsistent contractual provision, a "course of performance,"
as contemplated by the Code, relates solely to contracts for the sale of goods.
Sections 2-102 and 2-208(1) make this clear. However, the contract in
question is not for the sale of goods; it is a security arrangement.
This does not mean that the Code ignores or fails to recognize the
common law doctrine of waiver in commercial contracts other than those
for the sale of goods but simply that the plaintiff was hanging his hat on
the wrong sections of the Code. Instead of relying on Sections 1-205(1) and
2-208(1), he should have relied, as the circuit court cryptically suggested,
on Section 1-103 which sweepingly states that, unless otherwise provided,
the principles of law and equity, including estoppel, shall supplement the
Code.
2. The district court refused to award the defendant its deficiency be-
cause of its failure to give the plaintiff notice of resale. On the propriety
of this action, see the casenote to the lower court's decision in 5 B.C. Ind.
& Corn. L. Rev. 580 (1964), from which most of this annotation is drawn.
S.L.P.
ARTICLE 2: SALES
SECTION 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
BERK V. GORDON JOHNSON Co.
232 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich., S.D. 1964)
The plaintiff is a butcher and merchandiser of Kosher poultry. Wishing
to expand the size of his business, he negotiated with the defendant for the
purchase and sale of automated equipment. Before he ordered the equipment,
however, he was shown by the defendant a drawing which depicted how the
equipment would fit into his premises. In the lower right hand corner of the
drawing appeared the handwritten words, "Kosher operation." Later, the
plaintiff signed a purchase order prepared by the defendant. On the reverse
side of the order there was a clause in small print which disclaimed all
warranties, express or implied, except for a promise to repair or replace
defective parts within ninety days. When the equipment proved unsuitable
for the plaintiff's ritual purposes, he sued, inter alia, for breach of warranty,
alleging that the drawing constituted part of the contract and that the legend
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on the bottom, "Kosher operation," amounted to an express warranty. The
defendant moved for summary judgment. The court denied the motion, hold-
ing that it could not be said as a matter of law that the drawing was not
a part of the contract, or that the words "Kosher operation" did not amount
to an express warranty, or that the disclaimer excluded the warranty if it
did exist. Whether the claimed warranty "contributed more essentially to
the contract and its main purpose" than did the disclaimer and was thus
controlling was a question which could not appropriately be answered on
motion for summary judgment. In arriving at its determination that the
disclaimer did not as a matter of law exclude an express warranty contained
in the same contract, the court made reference to the 1952 and 1958 versions
of Section 2-316(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code. At the time of the
decision, the 1958 version had been adopted in Michigan but was not yet
in effect.
COMMENT
If the Code were controlling and the warranty existed, no doubt the
defendant's disclaimer would have been ineffective. Under Section 2-316 of
the 1958 Code, when an express warranty is accompanied by a limitation
on it, the warranty and limitation are to "be construed wherever reasonable
as consistent with each other." But if this is not possible, then, subject to
the parol evidence rule, the "negation or limitation is inoperative." The
express warranty prevails.
SECTION 2-318. Third Party Beneficiary of Warranties
Express or Implied
SUVADA V. WHITE MOTOR CO.
51 El. App. 2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313 (1964)
In 1957, the plaintiff milk distributor purchased a used motor tractor
from the defendant White Motor Co. During pre-sale reconditioning, White
had installed a brake system manufactured by the defendant Bendix-
Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co. In 1960, when the plaintiff was
driving the tractor in a tractor-trailer unit, it collided with a bus, allegedly
as a result of brake failure. The plaintiff then sought recovery of property
damages to the tractor-trailer unit and indemnification of the expenses
which he had incurred in the settlement, investigation and defense of claims
which arose out of the collision. The trial court dismissed, inter alia, the
count which sought to hold Bendix liable for breach of warranty. On appeal,
reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate the dismissed count. In
an action between the user of a product and its manufacturer, where it could
not be said that the user was beyond the immediate distributive chain, the
user's allegation that the product is inherently dangerous or defectively made
constitutes under Illinois law an exception to the requirement of privity.
The court went on to say that Section 2-318 neither superseded nor modified
the evolving local exceptions that appear to be relaxing the privity rule.
S.E.S. II
593
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
SECTION 2-601. Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery
HUDSPETH MOTORS, INC. V. WILKINSON
382 S.W.2d 191 (Ark. 1964)
Annotated under Section 9-504, infra.
SECTION 2-602. Manner and Effect of Rightful Rejection
HUDSPETH MOTORS, INC. V. WILKINSON
382 S.W.2d 191 (Ark. 1964)
Annotated under Section 9-504, infra.
SECTION 2-607. Effect of Acceptance; Notice of Breach;
Burden of Establishing Breach After
Acceptance; Notice of Claim or Litigation
to Person Answerable Over
BABCOCK POULTRY FARM, INC. V. SHOOK
204 Pa. Super. 141, 203 A.2d 399 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-714, infra.
SECTION 2-608. Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part
HUDSPETH MOTORS, INC. V. WILKINSON
382 S.W.2d 191 (Ark. 1964)
Annotated under Section 9-504, infra.
SECT/ON 2-714. Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to
Accepted Goods
BABCOCK POULTRY FARM, INC. V. SHOOK
204 Pa. Super. 141, 203 A.2d 399 (1964)
The plaintiff, a wholesaler of baby chicks, and the defendant, an ex-
perienced poultry farmer, entered into a written agreement by the terms of
which the former sold the latter 2200 experimental chicks. The latter, for his
part, was to keep records of the chicks' egg production and submit them to
the seller at regular intervals. Later, when the buyer discovered that the chicks
did not produce as well as others, he tried to abandon the testing program.
The plaintiff, however, allegedly induced him to remain in the program by
orally warranting that a new flock of chicks would produce "as good or
better" than certain other chicks. The defendant was to continue to submit
records of the experimental chicks' egg production, and in fact he did so.
When the buyer failed to pay for the experimental chicks, the seller sued
in assumpsit for the purchase price. The buyer counterclaimed for breach of
express warranty, alleging in part that he had been forced to buy eggs at
public auction in order to supply his larger customers. He asked as damages
his production losses. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on its
claim and for the defendant on his. The plaintiff then moved for judgment
n.o.v. or for a new trial in respect of the counterclaim. This was refused. On
appeal, it argued, inter alia, that the defendant had failed to notify it of the
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breach within a reasonable time as Section 2-607(3) required, and also that
there was insufficient evidence for the jury to determine the proper amount
of damages. The measure of damages, it argued, should not have been the
defendant's production losses but the difference between the value of the
experimental chicks at the time and place of acceptance and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted, under Section 2-714(2). In
affirming the refusal of the lower court to grant either motion, the court held,
first, that the jury could have inferred that the plaintiff had received timely
notice of the breach through the periodic reports submitted to it, and, second,
that the nature of the warranty being what it was, that the experimental
chicks would produce "as good or better" than certain others, the measure of
damages was correct.
COMMENT
Under Section 2-714(2), the usual measure of damages for breach of
warranty is the difference between the value of the goods at the time and
place of acceptance and the value that they would have had if they had been
as warranted. However, when "special circumstances" show damages in a
different amount, such damages may be recovered. While it could be argued
that the production lasses suffered by the defendant in the present case should
merely go to the value of the experimental chicks, there would seem to be
nothing to commend this view. The court did not specifically allude to the
"special circumstances" proviso of Section 2-714(2) but the holding is cer-
tainly explainable in terms of it.
S.L.P.
ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
SECTION 3-114. Date, Antedating, Postdating
PAZOL V. CITIZENS NAT'L BANK
138 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-301, infra.
SECTION 3-301. Rights of a Holder
PAZOL V. CITIZENS NAT'L BANK
138 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)
The payee of a check drawn by the defendant deposited the check in his
account at the plaintiff-bank and was allowed to withdraw the full amount.
When the check was later dishonored, the plaintiff brought the present action
on the instrument, in its own name. The petition alleged, inter alia, that the
check was executed, delivered and dated January 4, 1964; however, the
attached copy of the check showed that it was actually dated January 4, 1963.
The lower court overruled the defendant's general demurrer and the defendant
appealed.
The defendant argued, first, that since the payee's indorsement had
been supplied by the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not be a "holder" as defined
by Section 1-201(20) and consequently could not enforce payment in its own
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